Code One Magazine: Alexander Velovich: MiG Designer

Alexander Velovich photo With his first (ever) Mexican beer, Alexander Vsevolodovich Velovich washed down a plate of enchiladas, Spanish rice, and refried beans. The former MIG designer was assaulting his palate before speaking to a group of aviation enthusiasts gathered in the banquet room of a Mexican food restaurant in Arlington, Texas. Scattered around the room were many aerospace workers of his country's former foe. (The United States, in case anyone forgot.) Nonetheless, Velovich looked relaxed except for a few beads of picante-induced sweat on his upper lip.

Velovich, who was in the United States promoting joint US-Russian projects, has a distinguished career. He joined the Mikoyan Design Bureau in 1978 after graduating from the Moscow Aviation Institute with a background in mechanical engineering, flight dynamics, and flight testing. One of his first assignments at the bureau was to program a mathematical model of the MIG-25's air-to-air missiles.

He soon became involved in the flight test program for the MIG-31 and then deeply involved in the development program for the MIG-29. He rose quickly at the bureau, achieving senior engineer status in 1980. Two years later, he became a section chief. By 1987 he was the youngest department head at the bureau. In 1988, as a branch manager, Velovich was responsible for comparative analyses, combat efficiency assessment, onboard mission computer algorithms, stores separation modeling, system and equipment specifications, and flight test analyses. He also worked on the fly-by-wire version of the MIG-29. When he left the MIG Design Bureau in 1990 at the age of thirty-five, he was the bureau's lead engineer for special projects.

The day before his presentation in Arlington, Code One's Eric Hehs visited with Velovich for an exclusive peek into the Soviet aircraft design system and for a Russian perspective on the current state of the former union. Velovich now works as the Moscow correspondent for the aviation weekly Flight International. He is also the director of joint projects and co-owner of AviaData - a Russian consulting agency specializing in aerospace and defense projects. His relative youth belies his experience. His English is perfect. And his laugh is what you'd expect from a stout Russian - robust and loud.

Why did you leave the MIG Design Bureau?

I felt that the bureau was not in good shape because of all the defense cuts and economic reforms. I also wanted to be self-sufficient and not depend so much on someone else for my success. As I climbed the company ladder at Mikoyan, I became less satisfied with the type of work I was doing. I was less involved in design. I had more administrative duties.

The new environment in Russia encourages free enterprise and personal initiative. I decided that I could have more satisfaction and make more money by working on my own. With two of my friends, we started our own company.

What is the situation for those who remain?

I still have many friends working for Mikoyan. Three-fourths of them are not satisfied with how things are going with the company right now. There is not much work. Many programs have been terminated. Many still there are trying to find things to do.

Russians can make five or six times the money they would receive at the design bureau by working in an automotive repair shop. The head of the company, (Rostislav) Belyakov, recently complained in the Russian press that the average salary at the bureau is now lower than what someone could make selling cans of beer in the street. So, many of those who could find work outside the company have left.

What effects has dissolution had on the various design bureaus?

The breakup of the Soviet Union has not had any real influence on the design process. But many programs have been terminated. Very few development programs are still financed by the government. The biggest effect is that there is no money to develop and design anything.

We no longer have a Ministry of Aircraft Industry, which had a very centralized power and control over the design bureaus and production facilities. The design bureaus in theory are now more independent than they were three years ago in making decisions and getting orders. The money used to go to the ministry, which would distribute it among the design bureaus. The ministry would sustain all the design bureaus even though a particular one may not be performing very well. Now, without this regulating system, research institutes and design bureaus have a direct relationship with the air force. The lack of money, however, has had a much more profound effect.

What are former defense workers doing?

An aerodynamicist from TsAGI (Russia's equivalent of NASA), who was involved with computer modeling of propellers, is now a financier and the president of an insurance group. He drives a Mercedes. His partners bought a pair of Su-27s. I am here in the United States to promote this group to American air shows.

You can find people with technical backgrounds in new commercial enterprises. Many of these people are graduates of Moscow Physical-Technical Institute, Moscow Aviation Institute, and Moscow University's computer department. At least two-thirds of today's entrepreneurs are former defense industry workers or researchers.

What accounts for this high percentage?

Under the previous system, the most talented people tried to find success in the defense industry or science because these industries provided the most probable chances of acquiring better positions in society. This was prestigious work in a. privileged sector of the economy.

These talented people were the first to recognize the new opportunities and the first to move away from the former privileged sector to a more promising sector. These people are more likely to recognize where opportunity exists in a given economic system.

How would you compare the effects of this fundamental restructuring of your defense industry with the restructuring facing defense workers in the United States?

For America the changes will not be as drastic. You are already accustomed to the rise and fall that comes with bad times and good times for defense industries. In the Soviet Union, the work was always steady. We always enjoyed total employment in our socialist system. We had a very stable environment, with nothing to worry about. But if we wanted to change something, it was very difficult to do. The new system is psychologically very different and difficult for many people. The stability has vanished.

The disposition of former Soviet nuclear scientists has been of some concern in the West. Should we also be concerned about the fate of Soviet aircraft designers?

I don't think so. First, I don't think aircraft engineers are of similar value. One nuclear reactor is much more militarily significant than the ability to produce aircraft. But more importantly, the knowledge for both disciplines is readily accessible. Third world nations like Iran, Iraq, and Libya can get nuclear weapon technology from other third world countries. Students from these countries can attend American universities and learn aerospace engineering. There's not much that any country can do to prevent the transfer of technology.

Do you consider yourself a capitalist now?

I prefer the word entrepreneur to capitalist, though I don't see anything bad with the second term. I feel that I am a capitalist because I am a co-owner of my own company, which employs fourteen people. All of them have the equivalent of a master's degree in engineering sciences, computer technology, or foreign languages. We are involved in a variety of projects. We translate from Russian to English and from English to Russian. As an example, Aviation Week and Space Technology publishes a digest of its articles. Our company gets hard currency for translating it into Russian.

We also put out a magazine for professional musicians. Most of our employees like music. The publication, part catalog, introduces musical equipment from the West to the Russian market. It pays for itself in advertising.

We also have some contracts with Western companies that are trying to introduce themselves into Russian markets. We know many people in the Russian aerospace industry. We bring people together. New airlines are forming in the former Soviet Union and we are giving them advice on advertising.

My experience as a system integration specialist gave me a wide variety of contacts within Russian industry. I was also a member of the Soviet delegation to international air shows where I worked as a translator. This job acquainted me with people from other design bureaus and with subcontractors. These associations help me as a consultant and as a journalist for Flight International.

Getting back to your original question, I never was a true communist. I was always a bit of a social democrat. While both communist and capitalist systems have their advantages and disadvantages, I now believe that a free market economy and democracy can do more for people than a centralized economy and a strict ideological society. And I held this view five years ago, when it was not so popular.

But wasn't membership in the Communist Party required for a high position in any bureaucracy, including the Mikoyan Design Bureau?

I joined the party when I was being considered for promotion to deputy department head. I was a section chief at the time. My branch manager invited me to his office to talk about the promotion. In that conversation, he asked what I thought about joining the Communist Party. I was prepared for the question and did not hesitate in answering that I had nothing against joining, which was a bit of a lie. At that time, my thinking was to some extent different from the official ideology. To be promoted, I joined. But this practice was universal. An average level of management had to be members of the Communist Party.

I left the Communist Party in June 1990, almost two months before President Yeltsin did. I turned in my party membership card, stating that I disagreed with the party's policy for ethical and political reasons. Afterwards, several people asked me if I was crazy. Many still believed that dark times could return.

Were you a closet dissident?

I was not a dissident. I was a free thinker, even as a teenager. While that did not hinder my career, I often had to make compromises with my conscience. For example, if I wanted to work in the defense industry or graduate from the aviation institute, I had to be a member of the Young Communist League.

My grandfather was shot by a firing squad during the Stalinist purges. My father was always an anti-Stalinist and he taught me that. I always knew our government had done terrible things, and I always felt bad about it. When I was seventeen, I read Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago. The book was outlawed at the time, but you could get copies of it in intellectual circles in Moscow with some amount of risk. This book influenced my way of thinking.

When I was twelve or thirteen, one of my hobbies was DXing, shortwave radio. I'd listen to broadcasts from around the world. In Russia, information from the outside was always available; you just had to want access to it.

In 1968, Russian and other Eastern European troops invaded or entered, depending on your viewpoint, Czechoslovakia. That was the first time I strongly disagreed with official government policy. I was thirteen, and we discussed the event in class. I made the mistake of arguing against the government's action with a classmate whose father was high in the KGB. That got my parents into a little trouble.

How is it that the Soviets had or still have an edge over the West in some technical disciplines, for example, material science?

Because we lag behind in computer technology and in communication and information technology, our electronic systems are heavier and bulkier. A designer has to overcome these deficiencies. That may help explain why our material sciences may be more advanced. In general, aerodynamics and structural analysis is less influenced by computer technology than is avionics.

How advanced is your computer technology?

We have computers but they are not as advanced as those in the West. Some of our computers are made in Russia and the former East Germany. Many of our PCs were manufactured in Southeast Asia.

Despite Western controls on exports to Russia American computers often came through third world nations. Usually there were ways to get around the rules. I myself worked on American computers at the Mikoyan Design Bureau. These controls were probably more harmful to American business than they were to the Soviet Union.

Did fears of and restraints on communication hinder the development of your own computer technology?

No. We were just not clever enough to understand the significance of the computer revolution. (Laughs)

As late as 1989 the MIG Design Bureau was closed and the doors were sealed and guarded before great holidays --the first of May for international solidarity of working people and the seventh of November for the anniversary of the great October socialist revolution. We had orders to clean our offices. All typewriters were collected in one room which was locked and sealed. The key was placed in a known location. The government was afraid that somebody would crawl into the room and use a typewriter to produce leaflets calling for some civic disturbance. So now you can understand why we didn't adopt computer technology: It would have been too much trouble to move hundreds of computers and printers into that small room. (Laughs)

Seriously, the answer has more to do with communist ideology. The ideology favors material production over intellectual work. The working class is the ruling class of the globe. Those who work with their hands are superior to those who work with their minds. This concept was more fundamental in delaying our acceptance and use of computer technology than any fear of rapid and widespread communication.

Does the openness of the American system ever work to its disadvantage?

No. And I know where this question leads. There is so much talking and writing about Russians implementing other countries' achievements into our weapon systems. This was done but to about one-tenth the level that most Americans probably suspect. I'd like to quote chief designer of the MIG-29 and a man for whom I worked for many years Mikhail Waldenberg. He said "Seeing how your neighbor plows his field does not prevent you from pouring your sweat when you plow your own field."

There was much speculation that the MIG-29's radar was a copy of the Hughes' APO-65 on the F/A-18. I swear this was not the case. The radars first of all are completely different. Russian radar designers went through their own paces to get what they got. We did acquire the APO-65 but it was too late in our design process to use it.

When an air-to-air missile was chosen for the MIG-29 in the early 1970s we had access to an AIM-7 Sparrow from North Vietnam. The missile was closely inspected and evaluated. We decided that it was not any better than our own R-27 missile (NATO-designated AA-10 Alamo) which was being developed for the MIG-29. The Sparrow was put on the shelf and forgotten.

The perception that we copied everything we could is not true. In fact I cannot think of one system in the MIG-29 that was copied from an American system. We went our own way and made our own mistakes. We tried of course to use foreign information to develop our system better. The MIG-29 and Su-27 have an infrared search and track and a laser rangefinder. There is no such system on the equivalent American fighters.

The MIG-31 had the first airborne phased-array radar with electronic scanning. The system permits you to throw the radar beam from one sector to another without having to mechanically move an antenna dish. Until your Advanced Tactical Fighter, not a single American fighter had an active phased-array radar with electronic scanning. Your first airborne electronic scanning radar, the APQ-164, was on the B-1B. It appeared about two or three years after the MIG-31 radar.

In his recent book, Fulcrum, Alexander Zuyev, a top MIG-29 pilot who defected to the West, documented that an American spy working at a Russian radar design and manufacturing bureau for many years gave away Russian secrets to America. I have not come across one mention of the possibility of Americans copying Russian radar technology even though the circumstances and timing seem to support this.

But I don't believe that your APQ-164 was a copy of ours. People on both sides of the Atlantic work on common problems and come up with similar solutions.

When we first came to America with the MIG-29 in 1990, I kept hearing and reading that we copied the F-14 because Our aircraft looks like the F-14. They also said that we copied the F-18 because the MIG-29 looks like the F-18. Well, it's true that all three aircraft have two fins and two engines.

Fortunately, the F-16 has a single engine and one fin, so I haven't noticed anyone saying that we copied the F-16. But the F-15, F-14, and F-18 have two engines and two fins, so we copied each and all of them. I've read this in dozens of publications. Well, from the front, the MIG-29 resembles the F-14. From the side, an F-15. Its overall takeoff weight is similar to the F/A-18. So what?

People trying to meet approximately the same requirements come to approximately the same solutions. That's physics, which is not colored in red, white, and blue - or red.

Assuming we're incorrect in these beliefs, why do you think Americans accuse the Soviets of stealing technology?

You have achieved so much. Your country is a mighty world power. So you tend to see everything as proof of your own achievements. You express self-pride at the expense of self-criticism. Americans have always underestimated the skills of foreigners - Asians, Europeans, everyone else.

Is the MIG-29 a direct counter to the F-16?

Yes and no. The concepts are close. The Soviet air force decided that it would like to have a high/low mix of aircraft like the US Air Force. The Su-27 and MIG-29 would act as the F-15 and F-16. In the design stage, it became obvious that they wanted to mix these aircraft in a ratio of two-to-one in favor of the MIG-29.

The MIG-29's major mission was to win close air combat with the F-16 and the F-15. It was also designed to win BVR (beyond visual range) engagements with the F-16 and to be more or less equal with the F-15. It had to be able to shoot down any plane. It was not designed specifically to counter the F-16.

Usually we evaluated the MIG-29 against the F-16 and the F-15, and sometimes against the F/A-18. We didn't use the Mirage 2000 in this comparison because we understood the Mirage 2000 to be inferior to the American aircraft. If we can cope with the American fighters, we can handle the Mirage 2000.

Was there any competition between the Mikoyan and Sukhoi designs?

We did not have the competition as you had, for example, on your Advanced Tactical Fighter. That is, two prototypes competing for the same requirements. The aircraft were developed for two different specifications. But we did compete for the scale of the production. And we determined who had the better weapon control system, the better weapon integration, etc. At one point in the development phase, in 1983, the two bureaus thought about competing the aircraft in a series of simulated aerial encounters. That never happened.

But the real competition was for the resources to produce a particular aircraft. The Su-27, by the way, won. The Su-27's production line is still open. The MIG-29's is not. One of my last efforts for the MIG bureau was to convince my government that it is not smart to rely on just one type of tactical aircraft.

What happened to the concept for a high/low mix?

Even before the latest defense cuts, the Soviet air force decided to choose just one of the types. The high/low concept was abandoned. They said that the Su-27 can do anything that the MIG-29 can do. So they terminated the production of the MIG-29. [Ed. Note: Over 800 MIG-29s have been built.]

Was the Sukhoi design the better choice?

Those who made the decision did not consider fuel costs, which was nothing back then. But now we're experiencing severe fuel shortages for operational squadrons. Air wings with MIG-29s have more fuel because they get more flight time per gallon of fuel. The Su-27 is much bigger and heavier.

Another thing, the difference in cost as calculated by Russian "economists" was only some seventeen to twenty percent higher for the Su-27. This cannot be true because the Su-27 is almost twice as heavy as the MIG-29. As a general rule in comparing aircraft, cost is associated with takeoff weight, unless you pour lead into your aircraft, which no one does.

At the time, nobody questioned these figures. Our accounting methods were primitive. You could calculate the cost of an aircraft by sitting in your chair and looking up at the ceiling. Nobody really cared about cost. The state just needed a certain number of aircraft. When the air force was later confronted with the necessity of making decisions based on cost effectiveness, they did not have the necessary knowledge or skills. Any efforts to convince them of how economic analysis was done in the West went ignored until the mid-80s when Gorbachev came into power with some partial economic reforms. Self-accounting was then applied to all industries, including defense.

Now when they count fuel, maintenance, and production cost, the analysts realize that the Su-27 is much more expensive. I would not be surprised if the MIG-29 is put back into production because it is the cheaper solution and it can cope with seventy or eighty percent of all of the missions for tactical aviation.

You seem to be assuming that overall cost is a determining factor for aircraft design in the West. Given the cost of some of our more recent designs, do you believe that this is an accurate assumption?

When I compare our experience with yours, I almost always have in mind the F-16 program. It was for me an example to follow not only as an aircraft but also as an approach to an aircraft. It is a success in many terms.

Are Russian designs for advanced aircraft incorporating more low-observable technologies?

Low-observable technologies were incorporated in the MIG design for an Advanced Tactical Fighter. However the bureau's overall approach to stealth was less optimistic than it is in the United States. Well, of course, the F-117 is an excellent aircraft. Lockheed built about sixty of them. But you cannot win a war with sixty F-117s or with twenty B-2s. The F-22 appears to be a good compromise between flight performance and stealth technology. These aircraft are great for demonstrating your technological superiority.

Americans tend to accept stealth as some evolutionary step in aircraft development, as the step from the piston engine to the jet engine. I don't see it that way. Stealth is important, but in line with five or six others like integration of electronic systems, electronic countermeasures, and counter-countermeasures. The incorporation of low-observable technologies is more comparable to the appearance of look-down, shoot-down doppler radars. Cost factors are much more relevant. So is maintainability. But these are dull attributes. You won't sell any color picture books on maintainability.

Most of the design bureaus and manufacturing facilities are in the Russian republic, but many former USSR aircraft are spread around the former Soviet Union. How are Russia and the other republics dealing with these military assets?

There are several groups of republics. The Baltic states - Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia - regained their independence even before the Soviet Union collapsed. They have demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops and the Russian air force units based there. They have made no claims on the military equipment based in their territory.

Moldova, which is ethnically Romanian, will someday join Romania. But Moldova's Slavic population is against the move, so they fight with the ethnic-Romanians. Luckily, this conflict has subsided. Moldova has one air wing of thirty-four MIG-29s and only four pilots of Moldovian descent. They have used these planes in bombing raids on Slavic areas. Moldova announced that it would like to exchange these MIG-29s for helicopters, which would be more useful in fighting the Slavic separatists.

The air force units based in the Muslim republics of central Asia - Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan - are still under the control of the Russian air force. It appears that these republics are trying to make an agreement with the Russian air force to obtain jurisdiction over these units. But these units have ethnic-Russian pilots, who would not want to stay in these republics after such an agreement because their governments will likely shift towards Muslim fundamentalism.

The Trans-caucasian republics - Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia - fight each other. No one understands what is going on there. Georgia has production facilities for the Su-25, and it has already used this aircraft against its peasant separatists.

Belarus reached an agreement with Russia last summer. These two republics are not arguing over who owns what. But Russia still has troops under its jurisdiction in Belarus territory.

If the former Soviet Union is drifting towards a situation similar to Yugoslavia, the conflict will be between Ukraine and Russia. All these other conflicts are small in comparison. Ukraine is self-sufficient and has enough natural resources to do without Russia. Because Ukraine is on the western part of the former Soviet Union, many of our elite operational units fell into its jurisdiction when the union dissolved. Ukraine now has an air force with more combat aircraft than France and Britain combined, about 220 Su-24 Fencer penetration bombers, 120 MIG-29s, and ninety Su-27s. Ukraine also has some strategic bombers. In all, about 2,000 combat aircraft. The negotiations over these aircraft are made difficult by arguments over control of the Black Sea fleet.

Unlike the Muslim republics, Ukraine proclaimed jurisdiction over all military units in its territory. They asked ethnic-Russian pilots based there to take a loyalty oath to the Ukrainian republic. Most returned to Russia instead. But Ukraine did not let them take their planes. Now no one there can maintain all the aircraft, so many are sitting outside deteriorating. For example, eighteen of the thirty total Tu-160 Blackjack bombers were abandoned by their pilots and ground crews who refused to take a military oath.

Military production facilities in the former Soviet Union also produced consumer goods. Does this experience make full conversion to consumer production any easier or more likely?

About one-fourth of the output from military-industrial facilities is now for military products. But the reduction in military output is not being offset by any expansion in the production of consumer goods. Military output is just going down.

Our factories are good at producing many copies of a single type of product. Such a system can't cope with the fast-changing whims of the marketplace. A centralized system does not react well to consumer demand.

Are these production facilities trying to convert?

The managers of these plants and design bureaus are pretending to convert their production facilities to consumer goods in an attempt to retain control of these particular industries and to obtain bank loans and additional resources. Bankruptcy is not an option, because it will, they argue, ruin the entire economy. I think non-effective enterprises should go bankrupt. Let these managers become owners and give them a right to the profits. But let them have the right to go bankrupt as well.

What types of projects would you be pursuing if you were now in charge of one of the design bureaus?

General aviation. Light-utility aircraft for use mainly within Russia. By the virtue of its vast territory and under-developed road network, I think general aviation has very good prospects.

What are the prospects for success of cooperative programs in Russia?

Some will succeed and are succeeding. For example, Boeing is using TsAGI wind tunnels and researchers for their development of new commercial transport aircraft. Russia can offer the West a skilled labor force of designers, researchers, and workers. And the labor cost in Russia is a fraction of what it is here. We also have some unique testing capabilities at our research facilities.

Will Russia itself pursue commercial aviation projects?

Commercial projects for years received less attention in Russia. They were second-level projects. But some projects could still be successful.

A Tu-204, roughly equivalent to a Boeing 767, powered by Rolls Royce engines is now flying. An Ilyushin Il-96M powered by Pratt & Whitney engines will fly for the first time in March 1993. Both of these aircraft are equipped with Western avionics, but their airframes are manufactured in Russia.

What about military exports and cooperative programs?

Almost forty countries fly the MIG-21. Mikoyan has proposed upgrading these aircraft with a new Isotov RD-33 engine and with new avionics. I think a proposal to install Western avionics in the MIG-21 could be even more attractive. Hungarian MIG-21s are already equipped with British radar-warning receivers.

News reports give the impression that anything and everything in the former Soviet Union can be bought for hard currency. Is this true for military hardware?
Any government can buy any aircraft. We have a special commission that, in theory, limits arms sales. No regime can buy nuclear weapons, but anything can be stolen.

Many people pretend that they can sell a MIG-29. The only entity that has an official right to sell these planes is the Moscow Dyemyentyev Production Plant. But I've learned of two MIG-29s in private possession in the United States. I don't know where these aircraft came from. They could be from a foreign air force or from Ukraine, which is known to offer arms sales abroad through third-party deals.

Unfortunately, we have a free market economy without the controls you enjoy in the West. Before, we had a communist ideology governing a communist economic system. Now we have neither. We have a free market economy without an ideology. We have no commonly accepted rules or ethics for behavior in business. That is one of our biggest problems.

How can this problem be addressed?

I'm not sure. It is usually addressed with moral tenets based in religion. Believers and nonbelievers alike should automatically act according to certain basic principles. When religion in our country was outlawed, the habit of promoting commonly accepted ethical and moral behavior was wiped out as well. Stalin didn't execute 20 or 30 million people by himself. Thousands, whose morals were not very high, participated. And their survival has a lasting effect.