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Colonel Jeff Riemer is the director of the F-16 System Program Office at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. Riemer is a graduate of the USAF Test Pilot School and served as an F-16 acceptance pilot and USAF Test Pilot School instructor. He was chief of performance and flying qualities and operations officer at the F-16 Combined Test Force at Edwards AFB, California, where he distinguished himself as project pilot on numerous hazardous development test missions. He also served as the chief of F-16 USAF Programs Division at the F-16 SPO. His most recent assignment was program director of Special Programs at the Air-to-Air Joint System Program Office at Eglin AFB, Florida.

Interview by Eric Hehs, editor of Code One.

What is the primary function of the F-16 SPO?

The SPO's primary function is to serve the warfighters flying the F-16. The SPO is the interface between the warfighter and the company that develops products for them. The SPO manages the development, production, modification, and sustainment of the F-16 worldwide fleet. We translate requirements defined by the warfighter into contracts that yield products. Our primary interfaces are with Lockheed Martin in Fort Worth, Air Combat Command, United States Air Forces in Europe, Pacific Air Forces, the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, Air Force Materiel Command, the Pentagon, the Air Logistic Centers, and multiple international customers operating the F-16.

What style or philosophy characterizes your view of effective program management?

I am not a micro-manager. I provide people I work with responsibilities and expectations and point them in the right direction. I emphasize the importance of keeping our commitments to our customers, and I expect people on the contractor side and in other agencies we work with to keep their commitments to us. Our ability to commit to courses of action and to schedules is extremely important.

I have used a trust model for several years. The model is fairly straightforward. It emphasizes openness, being truthful, listening closely, and believing what we hear. Hidden agendas detract from getting to root issues. We need a willingness to admit to mistakes and address and correct them promptly so we can move on. Credibility and openness are big parts of the model. We have to depend on one another to do what we say we will do. We have to treat each other with fairness and respect. Both sides in the past have tended to make fuzzy agreements with wide latitudes for interpretation. Fuzzy agreements lead to fuzzy results. So, we need to make sure that we understand up front what each party needs and wants and make agreements we can keep. If we can't keep an agreement, we need to give notice immediately and make sure that we reset the expectation quickly.

What unique experience do you bring to your position as the F-16 SPO director and how will the F-16 program benefit from this experience?

I have been involved with the F-16 since 1981 in different capacities. My early experience in Fort Worth doing acceptance testing gave me insight into issues the company has to deal with on the manufacturing line. I also participated on F-16 cockpit review teams, helping decide what went in the F-16 cockpit. So, I'm familiar with issues behind designing and manufacturing the airplane. I also established some good working relationships in those early days. Many people I worked with are now higher in the company. For example, Kevin Dwyer and I flew together on the flight line in 1981 and now we are working together at the senior management level.

During my assignment at the F-16 Combined Test Force at Edwards AFB, California, I was involved in the development of many of the systems now found in the F-16. As a test pilot, I participated in the development of the digital flight control system, automatic terrain following, engine testing, and stability and control testing. I have flown the first Full-Scale Development F-16s at the test force up to the latest Block 50 version of the airplane. So, I have experienced the growth and the breadth of the fleet first-hand. We are still flying Block 10 and Block 15 in the Guard. Having flown those airplanes, I can relate to those pilots as well as to the pilots flying the F-16s coming off the line today. Furthermore, my previous experience as Chief of USAF F-16 programs at the SPO helps me understand how our organizational structure and ways of doing things can be improved.

Experience in many facets of the program from many perspectives helps establish credibility with the warfighter community, with the company, and with people in the acquisition community. The warfighter community doesn't always trust the acquisition community. My background will help establish and build that trust.

What distinguishes the F-16 program office from other aircraft program offices?

The scope of the F-16 program is tremendous and unequaled by any other airplane out there. The F-16 is operated by twenty countries in about ninety locations. Not a minute goes by in a twenty-four-hour day that an F-16 is not flying somewhere in the world. We have to be ready to support those people flying the F-16 and be responsive to unpredictable real-world problems.

Another distinction between this SPO and other SPOs is that the F-16 program is operating in all phases of the continuum, from design and development of new modifications through production. In addition, few other aircraft programs have a fleet as large as the F-16 to sustain. People at the F-16 SPO like the challenge. They can see how their jobs affect everyday activity in the field. In many development programs, people can't see the fruits of their efforts until well into the future.

The F-16 will continue to play a key role in meeting our warfighting capability for some time to come. Even though USAF F-16 production has diminished in recent years, we have approximately 1,500 USAF and over 2,000 international aircraft to support until follow-on aircraft take their place. As the fleet ages, many issues will require activity from all members of the team.

How well has Lockheed Martin been performing recently on F-16 programs?

Overall, you are doing great. We are producing fewer airplanes a month at a lower cost. That is an accomplishment that everyone can admire. I am pleased with many of the efforts and hopeful that we can make improvements.

What are the biggest challenges facing the F-16 program?

The biggest challenge is funding for modernization and for maintaining readiness in an environment of shrinking budgets. The situation forces us to focus our energies and prioritize our efforts to maintain readiness levels. Every dollar we spend on modernization is in hopes of making the airplane more effective, supportable, and reliable. Some of these investments do not have an immediate return. The current budget environment makes it hard to think in terms of spending money now to save money later. We have a strong case to make for such investments. Convincing people of the value of such investments is another challenge.

How do you plan to address this challenge?

We have to articulate with credibility the real-world impact of not making these investments. An $80 million on investment in radar today could save almost $1 billion in sustainment costs for the Block 25 through Block 42 F-16s, for example. This investment sounds like a great idea and we would pursue it if we had the resources available. We have to champion things that are smart in a fiscally constrained environment.

We have to show what an improvement means for a crewchief out on the flight line or a pilot in the aircraft. The night vision system we are putting into F-16s at Aviano is a good example. In a previous issue of Code One, you described how difficult it is for pilots to deal with light sticks in the cockpit, taking the caps off the tubes, positioning them on Velcro fasteners, and doing all this at night when the light sticks burn out. Thee night vision imaging system eliminates that hassle, makes the airplane safer to fly, and makes it more combat effective. We have to use examples like this to help influence someone sitting in an office in the Pentagon, someone who has not been out in the field. We must get them to understand why an improvement is important. More simply, communicating these issues is very important.

We also need to be a bridge to the future. We know that the F-16 will not be flying forever. But while it is flying, we have to maintain its readiness. We have to bridge our current capability to make a smooth transition to the Joint Strike Fighter. Rather than compete with future follow-on aircraft, we should aid in the transition to those aircraft. We need to look for improvements in the F-16 that will decrease our life-cycle cost, and provide commonality with systems planned for follow-on aircraft. This would be a win-win for everyone.

How does the transition between the F-16 and future fighter programs look now?

We are looking at how the F-16 program can benefit future programs. I expect to do more of that in working with the JSF Program Office. We are looking at transitioning to a contractor-furnished equipment approach and a contractor logistics system for the JSF, for example. These commercial approaches have implications for the F-16 as well. So our interactions can benefit both programs.

What is the relationship between the F-16 SPO and those who oversee the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve fleet of F-16s?

We have a good working relationship. With that said, the Guard and Reserve have often perceived the SPO as not moving fast enough to meet their needs. They have viewed our acquisition process as cumbersome and time consuming. We have taken many steps to improve this situation with acquisition reform. We are making some headway. We need to significantly shorten the time it takes to get improvements on contract.

If we are not responsive to our customers, they will find alternative ways to get what they need. Thee Guard and Reserve have done that in some instances. If I were in their shoes, I would probably have done the same. Alternative routes, however, have hidden consequences. They may get rapid implementation of a concept or capability, but they may not get the support tail that should go along with that capability-the technical orders, logistics trail, and long- term supportability. So they will insert a new capability into the airplane. It works great. But when it breaks, it is not supportable. 'Men the F-16 SPO often has to deal with the problem. The solution often goes back to that cumbersome process that led to their taking an alternative approach in the first place. We are winning some favor by trying to collapse our span times. We also have to show how certain processes serve a useful purpose.

The relationship with the Guard and Reserve is always evolving. They need to appreciate the value we have to offer. We need to work in everyone's best interest. Quick is not always best. Thorough within a reasonable timeline seems to offer the best solution for all parties.

How important is it for the Air Force to maintain orders for the F-16 to retain an industrial capacity for the United States?

The United States needs to maintain the capacity to produce premiere fighters. We need to decide where our long- range capability is going to be and invest the money accordingly. In the last few years, the Air Force has not requested new F-16 buys. However, Congress has added a few aircraft per year to maintain a production capability. Whether this trend will continue is difficult to predict.

What emphasis do you place on acquisition reform? Will commercial support – what has been called contractor lifetime support – and total system performance responsibility be considered by Air Force Material Command for future contracts involving the F-16?

The controversial issue of depots and transferring work to contractors from the depots has not been decided. I can't predict how those decisions will go, but I think we will see more open-mindedness in making the decisions. Ultimately, the decision has to be made according to what is in the best interest of the taxpayer and in terms of the cost of ownership of a weapon system over its entire life cycle.

AFMC needs to implement strategies that provide the best value to the government. If best value means using contractor capability because of limited dollars, we have to use that capability. We don't have the luxury to sustain programs or capability we don't need. I think we will see a greater willingness to support new ways of doing business as budgets continue to shrink. Things like contractor lifetime support will get more attention now than they ever have in the past.

What improvements would you like to see in the contracting process for the F-16?

The current cycle time to get something under contract is unacceptable. I have just come from a program in which we could contract major efforts, from start to finish, anywhere from sixty to eighty days. Some portions of the process are approaching these faster cycle times. But when these portions are added together, we are nowhere near where we should be.

My major initiative this year will be to collapse that cycle time. Some of the processes established for the F-16 program years ago should be jettisoned or redesigned to reflect a new way of doing business.

We are going to have to rely on that trust model I mentioned earlier because changing the process will take a lot of trust. We have to get rid of unneeded efforts related to negotiations and the proposal process. My goal is to demonstrate on the international and US Air Force side at least two examples of start-to-finish contract awards in ninety days. Both sides of the team need to address this issue.

What are the most important improvements being made to USAF’s F-16 fleet?

It is important to understand that the F-16 SPO is not in the position to determine what is important. We take requirements identified by the warfighter and translate them into capability on the ramp. What I view as important for the airplane may be quite different from what someone whose life is on the line every day over Bosnia views as important. We assist in identifying improvements and give our perspective. We provide useful information to help warfighters make good decisions.

Some improvements we're working on for the F-16 fleet include a new datalink capability called Link 16, a helmet-mounted cueing system, color cockpit displays, and the modular mission computer. We have combined these systems into an improvement upgrade package for the F-16 fleet. We are improving the F-16's operational flight program as well.

What scenarios might lead to a significantly advanced USAF version of the F-16, what some might call a Block 50-plus or Block 60?

USAF has demonstrated a commitment to the F-22 and to the JSF With that as a prelude, you won't see USAF buying a significantly advanced version of the F-16. Part of my role as a SPO director is to provide a bridge to the current plan. However, I must also be prepared in case the current plan changes. In other words, USAF won't be left without a plan. If JSF is delayed for some reason, as an example, I think we have to start looking at F-16 upgrades that would benefit our capability and improve our sustainment and reliability.

How does the F-16 SPO support development programs that relate to foreign military sales?

We have initiatives that link the USAF side of our operations with our international side. We look for cooperative opportunities to make sure that international customers benefit from USAF developments and that we benefit from international developments. The modular mission computer is one example of a cooperative effort. The MMC is being used in the Mid-Life Update F-16s for our partners in Europe and in Block 20 F-16s being flown at Luke AFB. USAF will benefit from the development of the MMC when it begins retrofitting F-16s with the computer in the near future.

What is your view of the potential of offering refurbished F-16s to central European countries interested in joining NATO?

After demonstrating our ability to refurbish F-16s for the Royal Jordanian Air Force, more countries will probably express interest in this inexpensive method for improving the capability of their air forces and for becoming more compatible with NATO forces. We are looking at programs for refurbishing mothballed F-16s in the desert and upgrading these airplanes to an MLU configuration. Refurbished F-16s provide a cost-effective alternative to countries that may not be able to handle the expense of new fighter aircraft.

How important is having a US fighter for being a member of NATO?

I'd like to see all new members of NATO choose US fighters. In my mind, the fighter of choice should be the best one the United States can give them and that is the F-16. These countries will participate in coalition forces. Coalitions work better if they have equipment and aircraft that are compatible. If they purchase F-16s, we know they will be compatible with the majority of our fleet. USAF and these countries can benefit from the economy of scale provided by these F-16 sales and benefit from modifications and improvements that go along with refurbishing existing aircraft and manufacturing new ones.

Several foreign air forces are considering advanced versions of the F-16. How will the F-16 SPO support these efforts if the advanced versions are selected by new and existing F-16 customers?

We will be involved only to the extent these customers seek and allow our participation. They will not want us adding additional requirements that may drive up their costs. If some of these improvements can lower our support costs, we need to determine what level of involvement can benefit USAF and the other F-16 customers. Countries committing to an advanced version of the F-16 provide an opportunity for the Air Force to benefit from these programs. The more development activity behind advanced F-16 versions, the lower the unit cost and the more attractive some of these possibilities become. All participants in these programs win.