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 First F-16 Mission
The first mission was a mid-day launch. By the time we got there, it was close to sunset. We had update points to correct the INS drift. But the longer we were airborne, the more the INS drifts. We had update points planned all over the country, but they wanted pinpoint targeting in a cluster of buildings. We didn’t have updates within fifty miles of that target so we could not provide pinpoint targeting.
We had preplanned targets, but they canceled them when we got there. So we went to real-time targeting, or time-sensitive targeting, working with US forces on the ground. We were in a new target area with no idea of the terrain. We had seven hours worth of INS drift before we started getting targeting assignments. The INS alone wasn’t hacking it. INS had to be tight for these targets.
We couldn’t use NVGs because the sun was still up. The infrared picture was bad, and the CCD image was poor as well. The GFACs couldn’t target safely what they wanted to target. Force protection issues prevented us from dropping. They gave us coordinates to targets we could drop on, but we weren’t sure exactly what targets they wanted us to hit at those coordinates. So, we flew back with our bombs.
We were all over the country on that mission, in the northwest, in the northeast, in the center of Afghanistan. We toured the whole country looking for targets. Command and control at the time was pretty archaic as far as getting real-time targeting through the various command and control stations and back to us. By the time the lighting conditions improved, we faced a tanker issue and had to go back for fuel. After that mission, we adjusted our scheduling to do full-day or full-night sorties. We launched out of our base either in the middle of the night to get there in the middle of the day or later in the day to make sure we arrived at night. The issues related to our INS subsequently went away when they installed our GPS and SCU 4 packages.
– Maj. Knuckles, 419th FW
- Update points – known locations used to calibrate the INS
- INS drift – inertial navigation system, which tells the airplane where it is, becomes less accurate over time and distance
- CCD – charge coupled device; electro-optical sensor used in the Litening targeting pod
- GFAC – ground forward air controller; person on the ground who locates targets for aircraft
- SCU 4 – software capability upgrade; software that allows Block 30 F-16s to use GPS coordinates for navigation and targeting
SCU 4 Upgrade
The maintenance guys were the heroes. They modified the jets almost seamlessly with our operations. The upgrade enhanced our warfighting capability tenfold.
– Maj. Knuckles, 419th FW
Learning Process
OEF was a learning process for everyone. The GFACs didn’t know our F-16s had certain capabilities, and we didn’t know the GFACs had certain capabilities. We had no way to coordinate or prebrief capabilities. The GFACs loaded their equipment on horses and rode into the country. We didn’t know what they had until we checked in with them, and they didn’t offer up what they had until we started asking them. We learned to ask the right questions to begin using the full potential of the systems.
– Maj. Knuckles, 419th FW
 F-15E Coordination
My second mission lasted about ten hours. One of our new pilots was flying on my wing. Weather was a factor in the target area, so our initial planned target did not work. We subsequently worked with a GFAC and some F-15Es. We used the F-15’s GPS to find the target to drop an accurate bomb. We dropped a laser-guided bomb through the weather, and the GFAC lased it into the target. Our unit was the first to drop bombs this way during OEF. Our relationship with F-15Es was a give and take arrangement. We had some capability with our targeting pod that they could use, and they had GPS that could get us to the target area more accurately when we had only INS.
– Lt. Col. Bam Bam, 419th FW
- OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom
Accurate Systems
The learning curve was at its highest slant when we were there. The conflict was very dynamic as well. We deployed to perform one mission, and another mission popped up. In other words, we were staffed and tasked for OSW, not OEF. We had people working twenty-four hours a day in the mission planning area. Ninety-nine percent of the time, we didn’t drop on those planned targets. We got to the theater and they tasked us to go somewhere else. The dynamic situation emphasized the importance of having accurate guidance systems.
– Lt. Col. Bam Bam, 419th FW
- OSW – Operation Southern Watch
Human Factors
The jet had no problem with ten- or eleven-hour missions. People were the limiting factor. A ten-hour mission interferes with Circadian rhythm and sleep cycles. One day we were going out in the morning. The next day we were briefing at one a.m. and taking off at five p.m. We had to balance crew rest with missions.
– Lt. Col. Bam Bam, 419th FW
Lessons Learned
One lesson learned is that AFRC is a capable force. We can jump into the fray at any time. Having reserve forces should be transparent to a commander. A commander shouldn’t be concerned about whether he has a reserve unit or an active duty unit working for him. I think OEF proved that AFRC forces are indeed transparent. We were able to get the Litening pod and SADL. We had NVIS before that. We were smart enough to see that if a force doesn’t have night capability and precision, it isn’t going to participate. A larger lesson is that we need to make these capability decisions and purchases as a total force. When we make a buy, we should buy it for everyone. Retrofitting airplanes to address inequities requires a lot more money.
We should provide the capability to everybody. Commonality is very important. The level of technology needs to be consistent across the fleet. Commonality is also important for command and control. Gen. John Jumper [AF Chief of Staff] wants machines that can talk to each other. Not only that, he wants information to flow from nodes that have it to every node that needs it without having to go through six other nodes to get there. We need to move in that direction with future upgrades.
– Brig. Gen. Pink Williams, 419th FW
- AFRC – Air Force Reserve Command
- Litening II pod –- targeting pod used by some Guard and Reserve F-16 units
- SADL – situation awareness datalink; a system that provides location information of friendly air and ground forces; information appears in the F-16’s head-up display
- NVIS – night vision imaging system; cockpit and external lighting compatible with night vision goggles
Frustrations
My only OEF mission was a two-ship mixed formation with two F-15Es. We took off about midday. We were in the target area from late afternoon to dusk. It was turning to dark when we left. We were having some problems with FLIR and night vision at that time of day. We air refueled once on the way and then again when we arrived over the country. We flew to northwest Afghanistan initially and worked with a GFAC. The Strike Eagles got called to another target area. We didn’t have GPS at the time, so we had to work with our INS. The systems were pretty loose.
We couldn’t find the target area. We flew back to a tanker, refueled and returned. My wingman dropped a bomb to mark a target area, but it wasn’t the target area that the GFAC wanted. An F-14 came through. We trailed it. He dropped and missed, too. Basically, all the fighters were not seeing what the GFAC wanted us to see. The terrain had lots of mountains and high ridges and valleys and it all looked the same. We were out of gas at that point and had to go. We lost our first tanker and found another one about 100 miles to the northeast. It was the same one our Strike Eagle buddies were using.
We were in the northeast portion of Afghanistan near the borders with Uzbekistan and Pakistan. We worked with a second GFAC and dropped ordnance using his ground laser designator. The Eagles flew a couple of passes before we arrived. This time, we found the GFAC’s target area, but then clouds began rolling in. The GFAC asked us to drop through the clouds on a heading over the friendlies, a very dicey maneuver even when we have everything lined up. We made sure we were looking in the right target area. I flew in trail of my flight lead. He dropped the first bomb. It fell short about 700 meters. It didn’t fall in the friendly lines but short enough that we decided not to drop again. Even 700 meters was not precise enough for GFACs in this situation.
It was getting dark. We came off the GFAC and headed south. We got a call from the tanker as we were trying to make a second pass with the ground controller: our tanker was running out of gas. So we left the area and headed back to base. Our tanker had to swing back around and refuel a second tanker, which we picked up to drag us back home. The sortie duration took 11.5 hours, and included eight refuelings. It was very frustrating. Our units longest mission lasted 12.8 hours. GPS is hugely important for providing the accuracy required for laser-guided bombs and for precision targeting. Had we had GPS, we would have been right in the target area. Having only INS was definitely a limiting factor for us before we received the SCU 4 upgrade.
– Maj. Jake, 419th FW
- FLIR – forward-looking infrared; a heat-detecting sensor in the targeting pod
- Strike Eagle buddies – F-15Es from Mountain Home were operating from the same location with the 419th
Rare Mission
 My only mission was a day mission that lasted about ten hours and involved four aerial refuelings. The situation would usually change when we showed up in theater. But I got lucky: my wingman and I dropped on a planned target. We were the first ones in our unit to do that. I can’t describe my target, but I can say that I dropped two 2,000-pound bombs. After the drop, my lead asked me, “How’d it go?” I told him my first drop was for Hollywood and my second one was a little short—by about two meters.
Our last tanker did not show up. My wingman and I got gas in Afghanistan and flew all the way home without another sip. It was a clear day with 200-mile visibility. We had 1,200 pounds of gas when we landed. The jet has some legs. The mission didn’t seem like ten hours. Daylight made it easier. I enjoyed a panoramic view of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran from the best vantage point in the world—an F-16 at 30,000 feet.
When I got back, I showed the video from my targeting pod to all the weapons troops. They got fired up. I pulled alert the next night. At three a.m. local time, I watched CNN show my bomb video. I’m pleased that our efforts got that recognition. My mission was rewarding. Very rewarding. Less than a month after watching the destruction of 11 September to hands-on immediate satisfaction with American airpower is a beautiful thing. I would still be in theater flying all day and all night if someone asked me. That’s my job. I’m pleased to do it. No one would have left if given the option to stay.
– Maj. Elrod, 419th FW
- pulled alert – some F-16s maintained an alert assignment as part of an OSW commitment; two jets and pilots were always prepared for short-notice launches over Iraq
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